Abstract: Realists about fictional entities often distinguish the properties that a fictional character “has” and the properties a character “holds” (see, e.g., van Inwagen (1977). Roughly, this is the distinction between the properties that a character really possesses and the properties it fictionally possess. But despite the popularity of this distinction in realist circles, it gives rise to a number of subtle issues about which fictional realists can and do disagree. In this talk, I aim to clarify these issues and defend three related theses. One: that to say that Hermione holds the property of being female is just to say that the singular proposition <Hermione, being female> is true according to Harry Potter. Two: that ordinary objects can hold properties insofar as propositions like <Napoleon, being French> can be true according to fictions like War and Peace. Three: that the distinction between having and holding should not be thought to be semantically encoded in natural language. Along the way, we shall see how a realist account of fictional characters can fruitfully be combined with what I take to be the most promising account of fictionality that has been proposed in the relevant literature: that of Kendall Walton (1990).