

Perspectives and reflexivity (or why reflexives resist being perspectival)

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Although the role of grammatical perspective has been studied with respect to long-distance anaphora (henceforth, LDA) and logophora, it has seldom been discussed in connection with co-argument anaphora (henceforth, “reflexivity”). This abstract attempts to explain this discrepancy in part by arguing that reflexivity, unlike other kinds of anaphora, requires additional grammatical “crutches” (which not all languages may have) to be perspective-driven. Evidence for this comes from the Dravidian language Tamil where reflexives *are* perspective-driven but involve additional verbal marking (the crutch). If the proposal is correct, it additionally supports the idea that grammatical perspective is structurally instantiated.

Background: Although sometimes characterized as being “subject-oriented” and thus treated along purely syntactic lines (e.g. I-to-I movement analysis of Pica, 1987, and relativized subject hypothesis of Manzini and Wexler, 1987), it has been recognized that LDA antecedence is actually regulated by grammatical perspective, e.g. for Italian (Bianchi, 2003; Giorgi, 2010), Norwegian (Hellan, 1988; Lødrup, 2007), Icelandic (Sigurðsson, 1990; Reuland, 2011), Dutch (Rooryck and vanden Wyngaerd, 2011), Japanese (Kuno, 1987). Sundaesan (2012) similarly concludes for Tamil that antecedence in LDA and logophora is determined not by syntactic subjecthood (which is neither necessary nor sufficient but is merely tendential) but by sensitivity to mental and/or spatio-temporal perspective (with subject-orientation falling out as a tendential epiphenomenon of this). In both logophora and LDA, the antecedent denotes an individual that holds a mental and/or spatio-temporal perspective toward some predication containing the anaphor. Additionally, Sundaesan (2012) presents evidence — showing that perspectival information influences the shape of verbal agreement in certain structures — to argue that grammatical perspective is syntactically represented. Building on intuitions in Koopman and Sportiche (1989), she proposes that it is a silent pronoun (*pro*) in the Spec of a Perspectival Phrase (PerspP) in certain extended projections (with the categorial choice of projection being potentially parametrised). This perspectival *pro* is in the local domain of the anaphor: it syntactically Agrees with and (LF-)semantically binds the anaphor, and is non-obligatorily controlled (Williams, 1980) by the perspective-holder individual. It thus mediates the relationship between the anaphor and its antecedent. Strikingly similar proposals have more recently been made based on evidence from Japanese and French, in Nishigauchi (2014) and Charnavel (2015), respectively.

Tamil Reflexivity Data: Reflexivity typically only obtains in the presence of a morpheme *ko* suffixed on the main verb (1). Strikingly, LDA and logophora can obtain even in the absence of *ko* (but *ko* doesn’t block anaphora) — (2):

- (1) Kalpana_i tann-æ_{i,*j} ki[[i-ko-ŋd-aa]/*ki[-in-aa].
Kalpana.NOM ANAPH-ACC.SG pinch-*ko*[-PST-3FSG/*pinch-PST-3FSG
“Kalpana_i pinched herself_{i,*j}.”
- (2) Siva_i [_{CP} Kalpana_j tann-æ_{i,*j} ki[-in-aa[-ŋnnū] nene-tt-aan.
Siva Kalpana ANAPH-ACC.SG pinch-PST-3FSG-COMP think-PST-3MSG
“Siva_i thought that Kalpana_j pinched him_{i,*j}.”

Note that the same anaphor *ta(a)n* is used in both reflexive (1) and non-reflexive anaphora (2). Furthermore, reflexivity, like LDA/logophora in Tamil, is also perspective-driven: (i) agents and experiencers — which, by virtue of their thematic roles, readily denote perspective holders — serve as antecedents, and (ii) just as in LDA/logophora, non-sentient antecedents are ruled out (which makes sense if non-sentient individuals cannot bear perspective). I will thus pursue a unified analysis of these patterns.

Central questions: Why does reflexivity require special marking in Tamil, and why don't other types of anaphora do so? How does this relate to the role of perspective?

Proposal: reflexivity, by definition, instantiates the only dependency where the targeted antecedent and anaphor are co-arguments within a single VoiceP. Recent work (Bylinina, McCready, and Sudo, 2014; Bylinina and Sudo, 2015) uses the availability of perspectival-shifting (between speaker-perspective and the perspective of a salient attitude-holder) in various embedded contexts, to argue that, while CPs, PP_s, and DP_s are perspective-shifting domains — domains that, under this model, would host their own PerspP — *v*Ps/VoicePs are not. I.e. the smallest perspectival domain must be larger than a VoiceP, thus will properly contain both the external and internal argument of a VoiceP. These points together have the important consequence that reflexivity is the only anaphoric dependency where the anaphor and its targeted antecedent are both within the same minimal PerspP. I adopt Sundaesan (2012)'s proposal of a perspectival *pro* in Spec-PerspP which binds the anaphor. Now, in the hypothetical reflexive structure where the co-argument of the anaphor would indeed be able to denote the perspective-holder with respect to the PerspP containing both itself and the anaphor (thus serve as the anaphor's antecedent), the perspectival *pro* would not only be non-obligatorily controlled by the antecedent as usual — it would additionally asymmetrically c-command it. If the co-argument is an R-expression, this would yield a Condition C violation; if the co-argument is itself a pronoun, a Condition B violation. Either way, the derivation would crash. Such a perspectival configuration is thus either avoided (explaining why reflexivity is crosslinguistically often not perspective-driven) or requires the help of additional crutches to overcome this problem (as in Tamil). I argue that *koŋ* allows the external argument to serve as a perspectival antecedent without violating Condition B/C by: (i) introducing a PerspP in its complement, and (ii) thematically raising the external argument from Spec-VoiceP to its own specifier. The external argument thus ends up in a position where it is above the minimal PerspP containing the anaphor, and can thus licitly serve as a potential perspectival antecedent to the anaphor.

I build on two conclusions in Sundaesan (2012). First, Sundaesan shows that *koŋ* spells out a head that is distinct from and higher than Voice. This is straightforwardly shown by the fact that the morpheme that instantiates Voice in Tamil linearly precedes *koŋ*, and also that the suffixation of *koŋ* is independent of predicate valency (i.e. *koŋ* can occur on unergatives, unaccusatives and non-reflexive transitives, thus is also not a reflexive marker per se). Sundaesan proposes, rather, that *koŋ* is a light verb equivalent of an intensional (e.g. 'think') or spatial ('behind'/'where') predicate — specifically, a semi-functional restructuring predicate (Wurmbrand, 2001) merged above Voice. Second, based on a native-speaker grammaticality survey and an investigation of the compatibility of *koŋ* across Levin (1993) verb-classes, Sundaesan argues that *koŋ* introduces a mental/spatial affectedness semantics which then “rebounds” (Kemmer, 2003) onto the external argument. She models this by proposing that the affectedness semantics is assigned as a θ -role to the external argument: since θ -role assignment happens under strict locality, the external argument must be “thematically raised” (Ramchand, 2008) into Spec-*koŋ*P.

To these two conclusions, I now propose a third. Perspectival anaphora in Tamil is always possible into the complements of spatio-temporal and intensional predicates in Tamil — which Sundaesan derives by proposing that they always host a PerspP. Since *koŋ* is a light verb equivalent of such predicates, I propose that it also selects a PerspP in its complement. Earlier evidence (Bylinina and Sudo, 2015) showed that VoiceP cannot host PerspP — but since *koŋ* is merged above VoiceP, this is not an issue: the PerspP is thus merged below *koŋ* and above VoiceP. We can now use this state-of-affairs to explain why reflexivity successfully obtains in a sentence like (1). We noted that the PerspP is merged between *koŋ*P and VoiceP. Thus, when the external argument is thematically raised to Spec-*koŋ*P, it is moved out of this minimal PerspP which

also contains the anaphor. As such, it is able to denote a perspective-holder with respect to this minimal PerspP without incurring a Condition B/C violation. In non-reflexive anaphoric structures, the intended antecedent already begins its life outside the minimal PerspP containing the anaphor: thus, no extra mechanisms (e.g. *ko*) are needed to help it denote a perspective-holder.

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