Coming and *Going* with a Shift in Perspective

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The verbs *come* and *go* are analyzed as having identical assertoric contents but different presuppositions (Fillmore 1971, Oshima 2006, 2007, Percus 2011). Very roughly, *come* presupposes the goal of the motion is where the speaker is (or their associates are), while *go* presupposes it is not (we put aside here complications regarding 'homebases', the tag-along reading of *come*, etc.; see Fillmore 1971). For example, if John is in London and is talking about George, who lives in NY, he could say "George is coming to London" but not "George is going to London". Since these presuppositions are often relative to the speaker (and/or his associates), I call them *indexical presuppositions* (not to be confused with Cooper's 1983 notion).

Contrary to previous analyses that assign indexical presuppositions to both *come* and *go* (Fillmore 1971, Oshima 2006, 2007, Percus 2011, a.o.), I show that while *come* has an indexical presupposition, *go* doesn't, and claim that the restrictions on the use of *go* should be thought of as *anti-presuppositions* in the sense of Percus (2006). The idea is that *go* cannot be felicitously used, when *come* could be felicitously used instead. However, there is a problem for this analysis. In some cases, both *come* and *go* are felicitous. To account for such data, I propose: (i) that there's a mechanism of *perspective shift* that alters the context against which the indexical presupposition of *come* is evaluated (cf. Percus 2011), and the anti-presupposition is only evaluated under one perspective.

***Go* is neutral**: I first show that *go* has no indexical presuppositions. Consider (1a), uttered by John in London. He knows that George, who lives in NY, travels every summer.

(1) Where did George {a. go / b. come} last summer?

(1) is neutral with respect to the domain of *which*. In fact, "He actually came to London" is a possible, felicitous answer to it. Compare this to (2), which presupposes that all possible answers are John's current location or perhaps places somehow associated with him (his 'homebase'). The neutrality of (1a) would be unexpected, if *go* had an indexical presupposition, as it would exclude the speaker's current location, London, from the set of possible answers.

The examples in (2) show the same point. In the same context as above:

(2) George didn't {a. go / b. come} anywhere last summer.

(2a) entails that George didn't travel to London last summer. Again, no restrictions on the domain of quantification. Compare this to (2b). This sentence is only about places where the speaker is or was (I'll come back to the relevance of tense).

Anti-presuppositions: But *go* is not neutral in (3). If John is the speaker, (3a) is infelicitous.

(3) George {a. went / b. came} to London last summer.

We can understand the restrictions on the use of *go* as *anti-presuppositions* in the sense of Percus (2006). Specifically, *go* can be used felicitously only if *come* cannot be used felicitously. Following previous studies, I assume that this competition is enforced by the principle of *Maximize Presupposition* (MP) (Heim 1991, Percus 2006, 2010, Sauerland 2008, Singh 2011, a.o.). Specifically, (3a) is blocked in the above context, because (3b) is felicitous. Furthermore, (1) and (2) can be made sense if MP is computed with respect to a fixed domain of quantification. That is, if the domain includes places other than London (e.g. Paris), (1b) and (2b) are infelicitous, and consequently (1a) and (2a) are felicitous, even if the domain includes London.

However, there is a puzzle: In some cases, both *come* and *go* are felicitous, which is exactly what MP prohibits. For example, (4) are both felicitous with the speaker being in London.

(4) George will {a. go / b. come} to Paris, while I am there next week.

Perspective Shift: Notice that *come* in (4b) is relative to the speaker's future location, i.e. Paris. In general, the indexical presupposition of *come* can be shifted to the reference time, as previous studies observe (Fillmore 1971, Oshima 2006, 2007). Fillmore (1971) notices that *go* is always relative to the current time, unlike *come*. This asymmetry is illustrated by (5). Suppose the speaker moved to London from Paris tow years ago and lives there since. Alex was in London

three years ago for a conference. In this context, (5a) is infelicitous, unlike (5b).

(5) Alex {a. went / b. came} to London before I moved here.

The indexical presupposition of *come* in (5b) is satisfied relative to the current time. The anti-presupposition of *go* in (5a) would be satisfied relative to the past time, but (5a) is infelicitous. What this means is that the indexical presupposition of *come* can optionally be interpreted relative to the reference time—a phenomenon I call *perspective shift* (perspective shift can involve other operators than tense; see below). On the other hand, the anti-presupposition of *go* cannot shift to a different time. I claim that this lead to a solution of the puzzle above, with an auxiliary assumption that MP is computed either with a shift or without a shift. Concretely, (4a) is felicitous, because *go* does not shift, so its alternative with *come* is also relative to the current time, when the speaker is in London. Then the indexical presupposition of *come* is not satisfied, and consequently *go* can be used. (4b) is felicitous, simply because the indexical presupposition of *come* can be shifted to the future time.

Monsterous Semantics: To account for perspective shifting, I postulate a 'monsterous operator' that shifts the temporal parameter that *come* refers to. Specifically, following Percus (2011), I assume that $[\![\ ]\!]$ is relative to an assignment g and two Kaplanian contexts, c_i for indexicals (which don't shift in English) and c_p for *come* (and others perspective-shifting items; see Bylinina, McCready & Sudo 2015, Sells 1989). The denotation of *come* looks like (6). I assume the pronominal theory of tense here but nothing hinges on this.

(6) $[\![\text{George will}_3 \text{ come to London}]\!]^{g,c_i,c_p}$
   a. Presupposition: $\text{spkr}(c_p)$ is in London at $\text{time}(c_p)$ and $g(3) \succ \text{time}(c_i)$
   b. Assertion: George moves to London at $g(3)$

George will go to London has the same assertion but no indexical presupposition.

Crucially, while c_i is fixed to the context of utterance (in English; see Schlenker 1998, 2003, Anand 2006, Sudo 2012 for other languages where it is not), c_p can be manipulated by operators (cf. Schlenker's 2014 *super-monsters*). In particular, I postulate the operator $\mathcal{T}$ that shifts $\text{time}(c_p)$ to the reference time. I assume that tense combines with AspP denoting a predicate of time intervals, and $\mathcal{T}$ can optionally appear between them.

(7) $[\![\mathcal{T}\ \text{AspP}]\!]^{g,c_i,c_p} = \lambda t'.\ [\![\text{AspP}]\!]^{g,c_i,c_p'}(t')$ where c_p' is just like c_p except $\text{time}(c_p') = t'$.

This optional operator enables perspective shift with *come*, as in (8).

(8) $[\![\text{George will}_3\ \mathcal{T} \text{ come to London}]\!]^{g,c_i,c_p}$
   a. Presupposition: $\text{spkr}(c_p)$ is in London at $g(3)$ and $g(3) \succ \text{time}(c_i)$
   b. Assertion: George moves to London at $g(3)$

Recall that the anti-presuppositions of *go* cannot be relative to the reference time, as shown by (5a). This is explained by the economy condition that prohibits vacuous uses of $\mathcal{T}$. Having no indexical presuppositions, *go* is unaffected by $\mathcal{T}$, so $\mathcal{T}$ is not used with *go*. On the assumption that the alternative with *come* cannot contain an additional element, it follows that the anti-presuppositions of *go* do not shift.

Attitude contexts: Interestingly, the anti-presuppositions of *go* do shift in attitude contexts (Oshima 2006, 2007, Percus 2011). Suppose the speaker is in London and Alex is in Paris. Then (9) are both acceptable.

(9) Alex said that George is {a. going / b. coming} to London.

We can account for perspective shift in attitude contexts with a different operator $\mathcal{M}$, which shifts c_p to the reported speech context (similarly to the 'monster' postulated by Anand 2006 and Sudo 2012 for *indexical shift*). In particular, it not only shifts the time parameter but also the speaker parameter. What is puzzling is why perspective shift of *go* is allowed in (9a) but not in (5a). To solve this, I claim that $\mathcal{M}$ is always required for semantic reasons, but it may shift c_p to the reported context or the actual context. The former possibility accounts for (9a) and the latter (9b). The details cannot be presented here, but indexing $\mathcal{M}$ will give us enough flexibility (cf. Sudo 2012).

(10) $[\![\mathcal{M}_j\ \text{CP}]\!]^{g,c_i,c_p} = [\![\text{CP}]\!]^{c_i,g(j)}$