

Suspending Factivity: *regret* and *realize* in false-belief contexts

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Abstract: Verbs of emotion (e.g., *regret*) and discovery (e.g., *realize*) presuppose factivity, but they can felicitously follow false-belief statements that suspend their factivity (Klein, 1975; Gazdar, 1979), in contrast to *know*, as shown in (1).

- (1) a. John falsely believes that Mary got married, and he **regrets/#knows** that she is no longer single.
 b. Falsely believing that he killed someone, John **realized/#knew** that he was a murderer.

This talk addresses this puzzle by proposing a *believe*-based account with two ingredients: (i) a lexical semantics of *regret* and *realize* that contains a backgrounding operator turning at-issue meanings into presuppositions, and (ii) a theory of presupposition projection in attitude contexts (Karttunen, 1974; Heim, 1992; Sudo, 2014). The factivity of *regret* and *realize* is derived as a context-sensitive pragmatic implicature, while the factivity of *know* is a lexical presupposition that holds across contexts.