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I present a novel analysis of intervention in *Tough*-Movement (TM) based on the idea that there are **perspectival domains** in the syntax. I propose that syntactic dependencies where the links in the chain are evaluated from different perspectives (=attitudes) are illegitimate. I show how such a semantic constraint properly covers the rich empirical ground of TM.

Background. Intervention effects in TM result when a (certain kind of) argument appears between the main clause subject and the (A̅)-gap, as in (2). Hartman (2012) generalizes that only Experiencers are interveners.

(1)   Mary is important to find *e*.   (2)   * Mary is important <u>to John</u> to find *e*.

Such examples have been used to argue that intervention is syntactic in nature. For instance, (2) is *prima facie* evidence for a **movement** approach to TM where the subject moves from the infinitival clause to its surface position (Chomsky, 2000; Hicks, 2009; Hartman, 2011). An intervening argument like *John* violates standard locality conditions on movement. A similar story applies to a **predication** approach, where the subject is generated *in situ* and linked via an Agree relation to a lower OP/pro (Řezáč, 2006). Again, standard locality conditions on Agree derive the ungrammaticality of (2). Keine and Poole (2015) adopt a **type-mismatch** approach, where the type of the infinitival CP is such that it cannot combine with a tree that has merged the applied argument *John*. Importantly, all of these solutions are fundamentally **syntactic** in nature, deriving the ungrammaticality from a constraint about the structure (plus some other mechanism).

Syntactic approaches fail to derive the ungrammaticality of (2) for a number of reasons, most notably, because there are instances where expected interveners *fail to intervene*. For instance, in French, an intervening argument is allowed, provided that it's a clitic, (3). Even in English, cases of structurally similar constructions where an infinitival (A̅)-gap relates to matrix subject do not invoke intervention. In (4), *John* sits between the gap and the subject position, as it must bind the PRO subject of the infinitive. (Note also that *John* is an Experiencer, and so contradicts Hartman's generalization.)

(3)   Marie lui est importante à trouver *e*.   (4)   Mary took John an hour to find *e*.
      "*Marie is important to him to find *e*."

Generally, syntactic approaches fail because they predict **categorical** intervention effects: All else being equal, if the right structural conditions are met (i.e., there's an intervener), the result should always be ungrammatical.

Proposal. I propose to analyze such intervention effects as fundamentally a semantic phenomenon. The first step is to recognize that TM predicates are Evaluative, involving a Judge argument (Kölbel, 2004; Stephenson, 2007; Pearson, 2013a). Judges can be implicit, in which case they are by default (generically) speaker oriented (ibid), or they can be explicit, licensed by a preposition, which is typically *for*, but can vary depending on the predicate (e.g., *to* for *important*). Notably, Judges are **attitude holders**, according to whose doxastic state the infinitival clause is evaluated. For instance, an unambiguous Judge, (5), as opposed to a simple *for*-subject of the infinitive, (6), allows *de re/de dicto* ambiguities in the infinitival clause.

(5)   It's important to John to meet the president.   (6)   It's important for John to meet the president.

          ok *de dicto* according to John   no *de dicto* according to John

Moreover, unambiguous Judges are antecedents for logophoric control. For instance, they permit partial control, a diagnostic of logophoric control according to Landau (2015).

(7)   It is important to John$_i$ [PRO$_{i+j}$ to meet at 6pm]

Finally, I note that, at least for English, arguments that are not attitude holders are not interveners. For instance, the "failed" intervener *John* in (4) also fails the tests for being an attitude holder. This leads to us to revise Hartman's generalization:

(8)   *Revised generalization about defective intervention*
        Intervention in *Tough*-Movement is triggered by the presence of an attitude holder.

Under the assumption that all clauses come with perspectival operators in the left periphery, which, in the absence of a local binder, are speaker oriented (Pearson, 2013b), then the ungrammaticality of (2) can be attributed to the fact that the individual Mary is being interpreted in two perspectival domains, that of the speaker (attitude holder of the matrix clause), and that of *John* (attitude holder of the infinitival clause). Simply, (2) is bad because there are conflicting beliefs about the individual Mary. I propose that there is a general constraint against dependencies which have links in two different perspectival domains.

(9)   *The Unique Perspective Criterion (UPC)*
        A syntactic object may not be simultaneously evaluated from two different perspectives.

The UPC makes an important prediction: Crossing an attitude holder is grammatical *when both links in the chain are interpreted from the same perspective*. This is the case when the Judge is implicit, i.e., it's the speaker, yielding (1). Moreover, the UPC predicts that it should be fine to cross anything that's not an attitude holder. Thus (4) is fine, because *John* isn't an attitude holder. This is also applies to French, where the dative clitics are logophoric centers (Charnavel and Mateu, 2014), but are not attitudinal. For instance, logophoric elements like *propre* (see Charnavel (2011) for how *propre* can be logophoric) are licensed in the presence of a dative clitic.

(10)   Son propre livre lui est difficile à lire *e* (mais pas ce de Marie).
         "*His own book was difficult to him to read (but not that of Marie)."

However, there is no *de re/de dicto* ambiguity according to *lui*, thus "movement" past clitic interveners is predicted to be acceptable.
Implications. This work proposes a semantic constraint on syntactic structures with wide-ranging implications, all of which, admittedly, cannot be explored here.

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