

## Community Forestry Working Group Publications

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**Publication list:** (6pages)

### *Journals*

**Chen, H.Y., Zhu, T. Krott, M., Calvo, JF., Ganesh, SP., Makoto, I. (2013). Measurement and evaluation of livelihood assets in sustainable forest commons governance, *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 30, pp. 908-914**

This paper uses case studies to measure and evaluate livelihood assets in the process of sustainable forest commons governance. The aims of the study are based on two key hypotheses: Community Based Co-Management (CBCM) has changed the livelihood assets of local community residents in the study area; and the changes in livelihood assets are different between participators in CBCM and nonparticipators. The findings of the study show that the total value of livelihood assets was 0.56 in 2006 and increased to 0.71 in 2010, which supported hypothesis A and illustrated that livelihood assets indeed changed significantly from 2006 to 2010. Livelihood asset conditions are significantly different between participators and non-participators in CBCM projects (0.77 for participators and 0.51 for non-participators), and the findings, taken together, also supported hypothesis B. Physical capital does not show a remarkable increase, but application of energy-saving stoves, mash gas pools, and the use of alternative energy sources optimize the household energy structure and decrease the amount of firewood used. The change in natural capital demonstrates that the majority of local community residents, in their subjective consciousness, are willing to protect forest resources and biodiversity. In terms of human capital, the capacity building of local people shows significant improvement, but their health status and medical situation are associated with a series of problems that need to be resolved. In terms of financial capital, household income and expenditures both show significant improvement, and alternative and diverse livelihood approaches have appeared and been well developed. Social capital shows significant improvements in some aspects regarding the status of women and the relationship between the government and communities. Finally, we advocate incurring the lowest natural resource costs to obtain the greatest benefits in the process of sustainable livelihood development and forest common governance.

**Yufanyi Movuh, MC. Schusser, C. (2012). Power, The hidden factor in Development Cooperation. An example of Community Forestry in Cameroon, *Open Journal of Forestry*. doi:10.4236/ojf.2012**

This paper is concomitant with our comparative study analysis of the interests and power of the stakeholders involved in Community Forestry (CF) in six countries. The study hypothesizes that, "governance processes and outcomes in CF depend mostly on interests of the powerful external stakeholders". For this paper which is on CF in Cameroon, the study hypothesizes that, "Power is a hidden factor in Development cooperation". Based on political theories, the paper uses the "actor-centered power" (ACP) concept of the Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) in Göttingen, Germany, the post-development theory and empirical findings, to back up the assertions made in the study through the analysis of thirteen different CFs in the South West region (SWR) of Cameroon. It analyzes the empirically applicable ACP concept, that consists of three elements: trust, incentives and coercion and at the same time connects these elements with the post-development theory. The

elements were derived from the basic assumptions on power made by Max Weber in political sciences and Max Krott in forest policy. The study confirms the existence of powerful internal and external stakeholders that influence CF in Cameroon and aims to empower important but marginalised communities. It concludes that, CF as a development instrument to alleviate poverty and increase livelihood while sustainably managing the forest has actually not brought significant or meaningful development to the targeted sector of the society.

**Schusser, C. (2012). Is biodiversity only a common goal in Community Forestry? An Actor- Centered Community Forestry Network Analysis in Namibia, *Forest Policy and Economics*, doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2012.06.005**

Recent and ongoing research has begun to question the efficacy of community forestry programs. In particular, analysis seems to reveal that devolution of power to the local resource user does not happen. Nevertheless, it also appears that community forestry programs do deliver some of their promises. Especially, the biodiversity of the resources involved is often improved. But who determines this, if not the local resource user? This article seeks to answer this by analyzing the biodiversity of 14 community forests in Namibia. The authors apply their power theory and methodology to identify the powerful, actors and these actors' interests. Finally, the author relates his findings to the real outcomes for biodiversity. The article concludes that biodiversity is only in the interest of a few powerful actors who have used their power to achieve a positive outcome for biodiversity. Therefore, the article argues that biodiversity in community forestry depends on the interests of powerful actors.

**Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012). Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. *AFJZ*, Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83**

A sound empirical basis is of high importance for applied research in forest policy despite empirical methods increasing the resources needed for research. Especially in developing countries, the extensive needs of field research might exceed the available resources. A sequence consisting of a quantitative preliminary survey – qualitative study – quantitative follow up study is recommended in the literature as an efficient methodological strategy. This paper investigates how to diminish resources by means of the sequence design and discusses how to keep a high research quality using the example of comparative power analysis in community forestry. The sequence design is applied in seven countries studies from which are two are already successfully completed (Nepal, published by DEVKOTA, 2010 and Java-Indonesia, published by MARYUDI, 2011). The preliminary quantitative survey is used to identify the group of most powerful actors for each community forest. The measurement validity, meaning the degree of agreement of measurement and theory, is kept high by simplifying the hypothesis down to the claim that a group of powerful actors exists. The reliability of the survey is strengthened by using, for each actor, the external estimate of his power by the other actors in the network. Nevertheless, the reliability is relatively low due to the use of standardized questions only, but it is sufficient to indicate who the actors of the powerful actors group are. The follow-up qualitative power survey ascertains the power resources of the strong actors which have been identified as such. It applies a complex hypothesis about actor- centered power which involves the three power elements of coercion, incentives and trust. Reliability is high due to such multiple empirical resources as are observations, interviews and documents. The data of the qualitative survey is used to improve the quantitative data of the preliminary survey. Finally, a comparative quantitative analysis of the power of actors in community forestry for all researched countries is conducted using the improved data. This analysis tests complex hypotheses which involve the power of different actors. The actors are differentiated using theoretically meaningful terms from which we can derive hypotheses for the empirical tests. In particular, the theories about bureaucratic politics

and interest groups can deliver hypotheses about the power relations of these actors, which are then particularly suitable for the quantitative test. The results show that the sequence survey can reduce the resources needed by about half. Nevertheless, the validity can be kept up by formulating hypotheses of different complexity and sufficient reliability can be ensured by improving the data step by step by means of the follow-up survey.

**Maryudi, A., Krott, M. (2012). Local Struggle for Accessing State Forest Property in a Montane Forest Village in Java, Indonesia. *Journal of Sustainable Development*; Vol. 5/ 7, page 62-68**

How local people can access state forests has become a central issue in forest resource management in Indonesia in recent years. This is because for most of the 'modern history' of forest management in the country, the forest resources have been at the monopoly of the state. In fact, there have been an increasing number of local people's struggles for obtaining meaningful and legal access to the state forest resources in the country. In response to these, the forest administration has implemented a community forestry program. This paper aims to observe the transformation the people's access to the forests, whether the community forestry program improve the access to the state forest resources. Employing the theory of access provided by Ribot and Peluso (2003), which defines access as the ability to benefit from a resource either legal or illegal, this paper finds that the community forestry program actually reduces the people's access to the forests.

**Maryudi, A., Krott, M. (2012). Poverty Alleviation Efforts through a Community Forestry Program in Java, Indonesia, *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 5/2, pp. 43-53**

Community forestry has been promoted as a strategy to tackle rural poverty in Indonesia. This article asks the extent to which the program can serve as a vehicle for poverty alleviation in the country. Based on the assessment on the economic outcomes of a community forestry scheme in the island of Java, this article concludes the scheme has yet to fulfill its high promises on providing forest users with genuine escape routes from their poverty-laden life. This paper further argues that instead of alleviating the poverty of the forest users, the community forestry scheme creates only subsistent economy.

**Chen, H.Y., Zhu, T., Krott, M., Maddox, D. (2012). Community forestry management and livelihood development in northwest China: integration of governance, project design, and community participation, *Regional Environmental Change*, doi:10.1007/s10113-012-0316-3**

In projects of community development and natural resource management, local residents collaborate with government and NGOs on decisions about forest management and participate in programs designed to improve livelihoods while sustaining natural resources. This paper uses case studies and survey data in Gansu province of northwest China to explore social, ecological, and economic outcomes of community-based co-management (CBCM). Findings show that CBCM appears to have significantly increased livelihoods for local community residents overall. Forest condition and attitudes about forest conservation were also improved. However, economic benefits were not enjoyed uniformly within the communities because, although CBCM projects are nominally available to all, certain subgroups within communities are less likely to participate. Greater education, being married, and access to information are all strongly correlated with participation and thus the economic benefits of CBCM projects. Women, although they frequently participate in household decisions, are infrequent participants in CBCM projects, perhaps because project design does not meet their needs. Future improvements to CBCM project design should include increased access to information, education, and equitable treatment of diverse stakeholders in the decision-making process. Such improvements would likely lead to improvements in livelihoods as well as more sustainable forest management and conservation.

**Maryudi, A., Devkota, R. R., Schusser, C., Yufanyi, C., Rotchanaphatharawit, R., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., & Krott, M. (2012). Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 14 (1), pp. 1-5**

Evaluations on community forestry outcomes are important to observe whether the program community forestry produces what it has promised. For the evaluation -as an alternative to the comprehensive criteria and indicators on sustainable community forestry-, we propose an approach based on the core policy objectives of the program. In fact, community forestry is very much connected to the following three objectives of: 1) alleviating the poverty of forest users, 2) empowering them, and 3) improving the condition of the forests. Based on field tests in two community forests in Indonesia, the focus on the core policy objectives appears to provide a more practical approach than the use of complex criteria and indicators. We conclude that our approach allows rapid evaluations and eventually reduces the associated costs and time without compromising the goals of the evaluation.

**Yufanyi Movuh, M.C., Krott, M. (2011), The Colonial heritage and post-Colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon, *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 15, pp. 70-77**

In literature on Natural Resource Management related policies in Africa and Cameroon in particular, Colonial heritage was defined and identified. The question of this paper is whether “community forestry” which promotes giving back the forest to people breaks with this tradition. The key elements of Colonial heritage in resource management were deduced from literature. Based on these benchmarks the program and practice of community forestry in Cameroon were evaluated. Data about community forestry in Cameroon was collected in 10 selected communities in 2009/10. Today in practice community forestry favors techno-scientific knowledge about the forest, separate nature from human life, is a bureaucratic controlled engagement with nature and is aimed to make nature and people productive. The benchmark identifies a strong Colonial heritage within community forestry in Cameroon and questions whether the aim of including the local people in forest management, correcting their previous exclusion by the Colonial policy in the management of their forest resources, thus, the self determined life of people within the forest can be reached.

### **Books**

**Schusser, C. (2012). Community Forestry: a Namibian Case Study. In: Broekhoven, G., Svanije, H., von Scheliha, S. (eds.). Moving Forward With Forest Governance. Trobenbos International. Wageningen, 213-221**

In article 1.1 Bas Arts and Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers briefly explain what forest governance is and how it emerged. As a solution to the vast and ongoing process of deforestation, community forestry is a new mode of forest governance. It follows the assumption that if government involves local people by giving them management rights and benefits to the use of forest resources, they will develop a feeling of ownership. They would then be more likely to conserve rather than damage these forest resources, because they depend on them. Community forestry would also help local people improve their living standards and reduce poverty. The main pillar of the concept is the direct involvement of forest users: the state must be willing to hand over some forest administration power to local communities. As Arts and Visseren-Hamakers mention, the results of local forest management are mixed. Some positive ecological outcomes, such as increased vegetation cover, have been achieved (Brendler and Carey 1998; Chakraborty 2001; Charnley and Poe 2007; Tomas 2006; Devkota 2010; and Maryudi 2011). The empowerment and improved livelihoods of forest users has not been achieved, however; according to Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001:192), “the poorest forest users have become worse off than before.” Who determines outcomes in community forests if the forest users are not the main pillar of community forestry? Arts and Visseren-Hamakers cite

critics who state that power is not addressed as an issue in forest governance research. This article tests the hypothesis that outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on the interests of powerful actors.

**Maryudi, A. 2011. The Contesting Aspirations in the Forests: Actors, Interests and Power in Community Forestry in Java, Indonesia. University Press. Goettingen**

The research rests on the question why community forestry, despite its promises on tackling forest degradation and the pervasive rural poverty in one single package of program, is yet to meet the high expectation. We observed that the research puzzle cannot be separated from the contexts of political processes and the dynamic of social interactions among the stakeholders involved in community forestry. We saw strong indications that key factors might be identified if we focus on the stakeholders and their power resources. The interplay between the local and external actors appeared to lay the explanation on the research puzzle since scholars hint that local institutions are vulnerable to influences from the more powerful peripheral actors. This suggests us to confidently underline that the powerful external actors are those defining the processes and outcomes of community forestry. We therefore offer a hypothesis that the activities and outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on the interests of the powerful external actors. We chose community forestry cases in Java (Indonesia), given the strong glimpses on the appropriateness of community forestry program. It is metaphorically said that no forests in the island are untouched by humans, indicating the closeness and the inevitably high magnitude of dependence of poor rural people on the forests. This research employed a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. We started the research by defining power as a social relationship, where a stakeholder alternates the behaviour of another stakeholder without recognizing his/ her will. By expanding —Weber's power against resistance with —Simon's power without resistance based on trust, we offer three power elements: i.e. coercion, incentives and trust, with which a stakeholder can build his/ her power over another. Based on the power elements, we developed a quantitative framework on power prognosis which allowed the research to get the first tastes on the most powerful actors within the networks of the selected research cases. The framework benefits us to the extent that it allows us to focus further exploration on the power features through qualitative assessment on only the powerful actors, which we believe are those influencing the processes and the outcomes of the community forests. We further evaluated the outcomes of the community forestry cases, and later tested whether the outcomes are functional to the interests of the powerful stakeholders. Our research has arrived to a comprehensive understanding that community forestry program in Java has had mixed impacts on the ground. On one hand, signals on the improved forest conditions are strongly emerging. Forest restoration activities have created visual greeneries and have improved the forest stocks while organized forest patrols have boasted the forest security. On the other hand, despite the disparity across cases on the degree of benefits gained, the forest users amass relatively few products and services from the forests. The research has also come up a conclusive finding that the mixed outcomes of the community forestry, rather than 'created in a vacuum', have been 'intentionally set up' by the contestation of external interests. The powerful interests try to skew the outcomes in their direction, as a result the direct forest users which are supposedly the core actors in the community forestry, have become 'casualty'. We have learnt how few external actors -albeit at different degrees-, have influenced the processes of the community forest cases through different power features or a combination of them. They transmitted their interests in the community forestry activities that eventually defined the outcomes, coherent to the interests. Overall, there has been a great deal of evidence and strong arguments on the connection of the existing outcomes of the community forests and the influence of the few powerful external stakeholders. Based on such findings, we are confident to argue that our hypothesis that —the activities and outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on the interests of the powerful external actors were well-validated. Only few external actors prove to heavily influence the processes in community forestry, their interests as a consequence drive the outcomes of the community forests.

**Devkota, R. 2010. Interests and Powers as Drivers of Community Forestry: A case study of Nepal. University Press Goettingen. Germany (12)**

Community forestry is acknowledged as an expanding model of forestry devolution. Its implementation has been mainly driven by the failure of ‘centralized forest management’ with the aim of enhancing accessibility of the direct forest users in forests and common decision-making processes, as well as the protection and restoration of the forest landscape. However, this remains rhetoric in reality. In fact, the community forestry is governed by the interests of the powerful stakeholders. Hence, the present debate in community forestry revolves to the issue of self-governed community forests and sharing of power between stakeholders aiming to secure a better access of direct forest users to the forests and benefits. This study is focused on the distribution of power among stakeholders assessing the options available in community forests by including meaningful participation of direct forest users, or rather a new form in which the biased influence of the powerful continues to dominate. Grounded on theories of ‘power’, especially on those proposed by Max Weber in political sciences and Max Krott in forest policy, the study argues that the activities and outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on the interests of the powerful external stakeholders. Therefore, the study aims to examine the current practices of community forestry in Nepal. Being organized into eight chapters, the study emphasizes that the community forestry should be seen in a broader context of social relationships between the Forest Administration, users’ committees and other stakeholders, who are part of the processes. It discusses the formal goal of community forestry referring to social and economic outcomes for the direct forest users, and the ecological goal dealing with the forest condition and biodiversity conservation. The first part of the study is mostly focused on the identification of the powerful stakeholders in each community forest network, employing a quantitative method based on three power elements: *coercion*, *trust* and *incentives*. Sources of data include formal and informal interviews with the stakeholders of specific community forest network of twelve community forest user groups (CFUGs) of Nepal, being selected by applying multi-criteria methods, direct field observations, as well as documents including available records and legal documents with network stakeholders. The quantitative analysis of this study indicates uneven distribution of power, in terms of three power elements among the stakeholders. With the empirical evidences, the qualitative assessment confers that the formal and legally based devolution practices of community forestry, are accompanied by an informal power network which guarantees that the Forest Administration and its alliances have even more influence on forest communities than before. The study finds out that the expected social and economic outcomes of community forestry are highly constrained by power disparities. Furthermore, the study shows that the notions of ‘ecological rationale’ have been effectively employed by powerful stakeholders in order to legitimize and capture own interests, while excluding direct forest users in community forestry processes. The study is concluded by stating that only in the cases when the distribution of power enables direct forest users to make their own decisions, then it could be possible to have common rule-making in community forestry.