

C08 – Collective decision making and land allocation at the village level

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Work Package I: Project Summary

The papers in this work package cover the following aspects:

- Land-use dynamics and village-level and policy drivers (in cooperation with C07; Gatto et al., 2015a)
- Contract adoption and village welfare implications for villages (in cooperation with C07; Gatto et al. 2015b)
- Market participation and trust preferences at the village-level

Methods

Following a joint sampling strategy with other subgroups we visited 98 randomly selected villages and conducted group interviews and behavioral experiments with 900 respondents.




Fig. 1: Land-use dynamics in sample villages (N=76)

Selected Key Findings

- Oil palm was not a major driver of deforestation, but indirect effects on deforestation are possible
- The transmigration program played a key role for the start and spread of oil palm in Jambi
- Positive effect of contract schemes on village wealth (especially contracts signed during the government-led phase)
- No evidence of exclusion of relatively poor and rural villages
- Villages that are vertically integrated into the oil palm sector exhibit higher aggregated trust levels


Work Package II: Project Summary

The papers in the second work package cover the following aspects:

- Relationship between ecological and economic outcomes of remnant or planted trees in smallholder oil palm plantations along a management intensity gradient. (in cooperation with B11)
- Motivation crowding induced by the framing of monetary incentives as Payments for Environmental Services (PES).
- Conservation and distributional outcomes of two alternative PES schemes. Test of an equal PES scheme, where a fixed flat rate per conserved hectare is paid, and a discriminatory PES scheme, which redistributes payments toward the poor.

Methods

The investigation of the first research question is based on the analysis of survey and ecological data (cooperation with B11) from 120 smallholder oil palm plantations. To assess the second and third research question, a modified public good experiment was implemented (360 farmers).



Selected Key Findings

- Trade-off between bird species richness (abundance) and revenue in smallholder oil palm plantations. Marginal costs of bird diversity gain changes with the initial number of trees .
- Contextual manipulations of a policy intervention, such as its framing as PES crowds in conservation behavior. This framing effect is driven by pro-social motives, such as the desire for social conformism or respect rather than by the activation of pro-nature motives.
- Discriminatory PES scheme not only provides environmental additionality similar to an equal scheme, but also realigns the income distribution in favor of low-endowed participants.



References:

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