

# LIGUO LIN

## **CONTACT INFORMATION**

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## **DOCTORAL STUDIES**

2003 - present    IDEA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain  
PhD, Economics, Expected completion July 2008  
Dissertation: Three Essays in Environmental Economics  
2005 Sep: M. Phil. Economics

## **PRIOR EDUCATION**

2000-2003	M. A.	Management	Northeastern University, China
1996-2000	B. A.	Economics	Northeastern University, China

## **RESEARCH INTERESTS**

Environmental Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Applied Econometrics, Climate Change

## **TEACHING INTERESTS**

Environmental Economics, Microeconomics, Micro-econometrics

## **ACADEMIC VISITS**

2006 Sep.-2007 Jan.    Visiting Student, Columbia University, USA

## **RESEARCH PAPERS**

“Enforcement of Pollution Taxation in China”, October 2007 (Job Market Paper)

## **WORKING IN PROGRESS**

“How do Local Conditions Matter in Enforcement of Pollution Regulations? Evidence from China”

“Explicit Willingness to Pay for Global Warming”

“Strategic Self-reporting and Firms’ Compliance with Environmental Regulations in China”

“Cross Country Study of Determinants of Environmental Performance: China, Philippine and Vietnam”,  
joint with Le Ha Thanh and Lourdes O. Montenegro

## **TEACHING ASSISTANTCE (in English)**

2007-2008	Econometrics I (Undergraduate)
2006-2007	Microeconomics II and Computational Economics (Graduate)
2005-2006	Statistics II (Undergraduate), Statistics and Mathematics (Graduate)

## **FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS**

- 2007-2008      Consolider Doctoral Scholarships, Spain
- 2007-2008      Research Grant No. 003591-113, International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
- 2004-2007      FI-IQUC fellowship from Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain
- 2003-2004      IGSOG fellowship from Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain

## **CONFERENCES**

- 2007 May      EEPSEA 27<sup>th</sup> Biannual Workshop, Beijing, China
- 2007 Feb.      ENTER Jamboree 2007, Mannheim, Germany
- 2006 Nov.      EEPSEA 26<sup>th</sup> Biannual Workshop, Cebu, Philippine
- 2006 July      PACE 2006 Summer Camp Environmental and Resource Economics in China, Qingdao, China
- 2006 July      6<sup>th</sup> Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources and the Environment, IAMZ, Zaragoza, Spain

## **SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS**

- 2006 June      Microeconomics Workshop at UAB, Barcelona, Spain,  
2007 Oct.
- 2005 Sep.      BEC Workshop at UAB, Barcelona, Spain,

## **LANGUAGES**

Chinese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (fair)

## **COMPUTATION SKILLS**

GAMS, MATLAB, STATA & EVIEWS

## **REFERENCE**

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## **ABSTRACTS of DISSERTATION**

### **Enforcement of Pollution Taxation in China (Job Market Paper)**

We investigate how plants react to inspections conducted by environmental authorities under the pollution taxation regulation in China. Contrary to the studies in US/Canada (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Laplant and Rilstone, 1996) or previous studies in China (Dasgupta et al. 2001), we find inspections increase plants' self-reported pollution by 8.26%. We provide a model to analyze plants' strategic reactions to the pollution taxation regulation in China. The model concludes that under the specific regulation plants' actual pollution might be going up with the increase of inspections. Our study provides a key policy implication that inspections by environmental authorities in China are mainly effective on verifying plants' self-reported pollution but not on reducing their pollution. In order to control pollution, a reform of the regulation is necessary.

### **How do Local Conditions Matter in Enforcement of Pollution Regulations? Evidence from China (In Progress)**

By adopting the plant-level data in China, we investigate how inspection and monitoring strategies of environmental regulatory agencies vary with local conditions. We show that greater inspection effort is allocated towards those plants that emit pollution likely to generate higher level of damages. We also show that the behavior of regulators is also a function of variables that are not directly correlated with plants' pollution and its consequent damages.

### **Explicit Willingness to Pay for Global Warming (In Progress)**

We modify the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative climate-change strategies by integrating explicit willingness to pay for reducing carbon dioxide emissions. By calibrating the model, we find that it may underestimate the welfare loss of global warming by only considering the production side damage of global warming and hence make the policy path away from the optimal one. Implementing Clean Development Mechanism increases the welfare of both developed and developing countries.